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1. Background and Introduction 
Integrated water resources management (IWRM) and organizing it primarily at the river 
basin level are two of the most common and widely repeated recommendations in the 
water resources literature of the last decade if not longer (Allee 1988; Galloway 1997; 
McDonald and Kay 1988; World Bank 1993).  Basin management is often associated with 
the concept of decentralization, of managing water resources at the “lowest appropriate 
level.” (See, e.g., International Conference on Water and the Environment 1992; Mody 
2001).  Several conceptual arguments have been presented in favor of decentralization in 
water resource management, and basin-level management in particular, including that the 
whole array of resources and use patterns in the basin will be taken into account, 
management decisions will be based on better knowledge of local conditions, and 
incentives for stakeholders to actively participate in management will be stronger. 
 Empirical studies of river basin management systems provide opportunities to 
examine the claims made for basin-level integrated water resources management, and to 
explore factors that appear to influence its implementation and outcomes.  In this research 
project the project team has searched for those factors and their relationships to river basin 
management in two ways: with a survey of river basin organizations throughout the world, 
and with case studies of eight river basins analyzed in greater detail.  Some of those eight 
cases have long histories of basin-scale institutions for water resource management, such 
as the Guadalquivir river basin in Spain and the Murray-Darling river basin in Australia.  
Others have emerged recently, as in the Tárcoles basin of Costa Rica where a river basin 
commission, the Coordinating Commission for the Río Grande de Tárcoles (CRGT), was 
established in the early 1990s. 
 This case has been extremely valuable because the formation of the basin 
commission was a locally-initiated action that occurred in the fairly recent memory of 
many individuals who are still actively involved in water and government, and whose 
perspectives on the origin, growth, and recent difficulties of the basin management effort 
are both fresh and rich.  The Tárcoles basin therefore provided an opportunity to explore 
the early life cycle of a river basin organization and some of the factors that were linked to 
its origin, early growth, and recent stagnation. 
 This paper focuses on analysis of the effort to establish river basin management in 
the Tárcoles basin, and provides only brief descriptions of its physical characteristics, 
social and economic profile, and historical development.  More detailed information about 
those important matters may be found in the appendices. 
 
2. Analytical Framework 
To analyze the data gathered for this project from the case studies and from the survey of 
river basin organizations, the project team has developed a framework that identifies a 
number of political and institutional factors which may be associated with the emergence, 
sustainability, and success or failure of decentralized approaches to integrated water 
resource management at the basin scale.  These factors, and their hypothesized 
relationships with basin management in a country that has decentralized or is attempting to 
decentralize water resource management institutions, are derived from the institutional 
analysis literature relating to water or other natural resource management and to 
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decentralized systems (especially Ostrom 1990, 1992; also Agrawal 2000; Alaerts 1999; 
Blomquist and Schlager 1999; Bromley 1999; Easter and Hearne 1993; Wunsch 1991). 
Our information gathering and analysis focuses on the following sets of variables. 
 
 Contextual factors and initial conditions 
 Characteristics of the decentralization process 
 Characteristics of central government/basin-level relationships and capacities 
 The internal configuration of basin-level institutional arrangements 
 Motivation of stakeholders 
 
 Variables considered within each set are listed in Appendix 1.  The Tárcoles Basin 
case is discussed in terms of these categories and variables in Section 8. 
 
3. Methodology 
A case study approach was pursued for this project in order to examine closely the 
processes of institutional change as well as the current situation.   An expert in water 
policy and management affairs in Costa Rica facilitated the site visit, arranging interviews 
and preparing a background paper on the basin prior to the visit (Ballestero 2003).  
Background papers for all case study visits are based on a common outline.  During the 
site visit, team members met with and interviewed a range of individuals, including basin-
level stakeholders, past and current central and local government officials, past and current 
basin commission staff and members, and academic researchers with perspectives on 
governmental structure and water management in Costa Rica.2  The semi-structured 
interviews were conducted with a view to understanding the processes of institutional 
origin and change within the Tárcoles basin, the incentives of different stakeholders 
related to such change, and the performance of water management institutions at sub-
basin, basin, and national scales, matters that were closely within the knowledge of the 
interviewees.  After the visit, team members combined their notes from the interviews, 
revisited and revised the basin background paper, reviewed other materials, and composed 
this summary and analysis of the river basin management situation in the Tárcoles basin. 
 The following analysis of the Tárcoles basin case is therefore based on a 
combination of sources—documentary materials on Costa Rica and the Tárcoles basin, the 
background paper prepared for the visit, and the interviews conducted during the site visit.  
The findings and conclusions therefore do not represent the point of view of a single 
individual or organization, but emerge from a composite of data collected and reviewed by 
the research project team. 
 
                                                 
2 Organizations from which individuals were interviewed are the Tárcoles River Basin Commission, the 
Costa Rican National Assembly, the Costa Rican Ministry of Environment and Energy, Department of 
National Waters, Institute of Aqueducts and Sewers, the Institute of Electricity, National Power and Light 
Company, Institute for Municipal Promotion and Assistance, the National System of Conservation Areas, the 
State of the Nation Project, the Central American Commission for Environment and Development, the Inter-
American Development Bank, the Center for Environment and Natural Resources, the Association of Private 
Electricity Companies, the National Chamber of Livestock Producers, the municipalities of San José and 
Belén, the University of Costa Rica, the National University of Costa Rica, and the Florida Bebidas 
corporation. 
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4. Tárcoles Basin Water Management Issues and Stakeholders 
4.1 Physical Characteristics 
With its mountainous spine and numerous valleys, Costa Rica contains 34 river basins.  
The Grande de Tárcoles river basin—the drainage area of the Río Grande de Tárcoles, 
called hereafter the Tárcoles basin—is located in the west-central portion of Costa Rica 
and extends from the mountain ranges in the middle of the country to the Pacific coast 
(Figure 1).  The Río Grande de Tárcoles, a river of 111 km length that empties in the 
Pacific, is formed by the confluence of the Alajuela, Grande, and Virilla rivers toward the 
middle of the basin. 
 Costa Rica as a whole has abundant precipitation and runoff, ranging from 1,200 
to 7,000 mm per year.  The river basins on the Pacific side, such as the Tárcoles, tend to 
be somewhat drier with a noticeable reduction of river flow during the dry season of the 
year.  Still, precipitation in the Tárcoles basin ranges from 948 mm to 5,409 mm per year, 
with an annual average of 2,364 mm.  Flooding is a recurring problem in this basin as in 
most of the river basins of Costa Rica. 
 
 
Figure 1: Location of the Tárcoles basin within Costa Rica 
Source: Ballestero (2003) 
 
 There are three distinct subareas within the Tárcoles basin—an upper area that 
corresponds with the watershed of the Virilla river and is about 40% of the total basin, a 
middle area that corresponds with the watershed of the Grande River and is about 34% of 
the total basin, and a lower area along the course of the Río Grande de Tárcoles below the 
confluence of the Virilla and Grande rivers, which is about 26% of the total basin area.  
The middle basin is semi-rural with some population centers, and the lower basin is 
mostly rural.  The upper basin contains about 80% of the population in the basin, with 
large concentrations of both urban population and industry.  It also contains the largest 
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aquifer systems in the basin—the Barva and Colima aquifers, which are layered aquifer 
systems that supply most of the groundwater used for industry and the urban population. 
 Relative to the rest of Costa Rica (and in light of the large number of river basins 
there), the Tárcoles basin is fairly large—at 2,155 km2 total area, the basin represents 
4.2% of the total land area, and the upper and middle areas (the Virilla and Grande 
watersheds) are two of the largest watersheds in the country.  But these geographic 
dimensions do not capture the greater significance of the Tárcoles basin to Costa Rica.  
With only 1/25 of the land area, the Tárcoles basin is home to half the nation’s population 
(approximately 2 million of the 4 million in the country), contains 80% of the nation’s 
industry, 80% of all the vehicles, and more than half of all the registered wells. 
 The cities in the upper basin have grown into a large metropolis at the center of 
Costa Rica known as the Greater Metropolitan Area or GAM (Gran Área Metropolitana).  
This metropolitan area includes San José, the nation’s capital, and three other cities.  The 
GAM is also the transportation center of the country, with the national highways that 
reach the other regions of Costa Rica converging and intersecting in the Tárcoles basin.  
The area is also crucial to Costa Rica’s important and growing tourism industry, as most 
tourists pass through the international airport in Alajuela and stay in the area for at least a 
portion of their time in the country. 
 Despite the growth of urban and industrial centers within the basin, 37% of the 
land use remains in crops and pasture.  Coffee farming, other crops with and without 
irrigation, dairy farming and livestock ranching occur throughout the basin. 
4.2 Water Resource Issues and Problems  
Although precipitation is abundant, the concentration of people, industry, and agriculture 
in the Tárcoles basin translates into significant and growing water resource problems.  
Those problems are exacerbated by institutional arrangements governing water 
management at the national level, and by financial constraints that have kept infrastructure 
development within the basin from keeping pace with economic development and 
population growth.  The 2001 “State of the Nation” report identified the vulnerability of 
water resources and water quality as Costa Rica’s biggest environmental concern, with the 
Tárcoles basin as the principal focus for that concern. 
Sewage, Solid Waste and Water Pollution 
Although one could start with any of a number of problems, the most striking is probably 
this—that the Tárcoles basin, with its 2 million inhabitants and its economic activity, lacks 
sewage treatment facilities.  Nearly all of the domestic and industrial wastes collected in 
the basin are discharged without treatment; only 4% are treated.  The streams and rivers of 
the Tárcoles basin receive untreated domestic and industrial wastewater on a massive scale 
all year long, year after year.  The Virilla River alone receives an estimated 250,000 cubic 
meters of untreated wastewater every day. 
 Industrial wastes contribute contaminants in addition to the sewage that emanates 
from households in the basin.  Agribusinesses, especially food and coffee processing 
industries, are prevalent throughout the upper and middle basin areas—more than half of 
all coffee processing in Costa Rica occurs in the Tárcoles basin.  In addition, the upper 
basin contains 29 chemical and alcohol manufacturing facilities.  Although national law 
requires treatment of industrial wastes, most industries still do not have facilities in place. 
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The surface waters of the basin are also the depository for rubbish.  Due to inadequate 
solid waste collection and disposal, especially in the GAM in the upper basin area, trash is 
simply dumped into valleys and rivers.  In addition to the obvious negative aesthetic 
impact, the accumulation of trash in the rivers aggravates flooding problems where it 
chokes off stream channels, and adds a significant nuisance and expense to the operation 
of hydroelectric power facilities located along the banks.  The national power and light 
company (CNFL – Companía Nacional de Fuerza y Luz) has estimated that it spends 
millions of dollars per year clearing out water intake facilities infiltrated with trash.  Urban 
and agricultural runoff also proceeds relatively unimpeded to the rivers and streams of the 
Tárcoles basin, further worsening water quality. 
 Not surprisingly, surface waters in the basin exhibit high concentrations of 
coliforms, heavy metals, and suspended solids.  By the time the Tárcoles reaches its mouth 
at the Gulf of Nicoya on the Pacific coast, pollution levels are so high that “red tide” 
conditions are observed from time to time, and the coastal tourism flourishing elsewhere 
in Costa Rica is very limited there. 
 Groundwater in the basin is vulnerable to quality degradation as well.  Septic tanks 
serve 68.5% of households and businesses in the basin, so those that are not discharging to 
surface waters are discharging to the ground.  The prevalence of septic systems represents 
a significant threat to groundwater quality, particularly in the upper basin area where 
groundwater is an important water source for industry and the population and where 
nitrate contamination associated with septic leaching is a rising concern.  Agricultural 
activity in the basin has also negatively affected groundwater quality.  Application of 
fertilizers, especially in high concentrations for intensive coffee farming, is associated 
with further nitrate contamination of groundwater in the upper and middle basin areas 
(Reynolds-Vargas and Richter 1995). 
 These water quality problems ultimately affect water availability for human uses.  
“If the pollution continues at the present rate, we estimate that in 10 years the availability 
of potable water in terms of both quantity and quality will be minimal,” said José Luis 
Salas in 2000, when he was Deputy to the Minister of Environment and also the CRGT 
coordinator. (Dulude 2000) 
 For industries and urban populations that rely on groundwater, contamination 
threatens to cut off what has been their best-quality water source.  Although groundwater 
use is estimated to be only 6% of total water use in the Tárcoles basin, its importance is 
very high because of these sectors that rely most upon it.  The polluted surface water, in 
contrast, already requires significant treatment prior to use.  Even here there are gaps that 
raise concerns about public health—not every water supplier (especially smaller ones) has 
adequate water treatment facilities.  Many smaller water systems lack the financial and 
technical capacity to provide better quality water for their customers.  It is estimated that 
31% of the population in the basin receives untreated water, and 42% receive water that 
(treated or not) is not subject to any regular quality control or monitoring.  In fact, three of 
the provinces of Costa Rica with the lowest coverage of quality drinking water for the 





Population growth and economic development in the Tárcoles basin have also changed the 
land surface, in ways that aggravate both water quality and quantity problems.  
Deforestation of the upper and middle basin areas continues despite serious national 
efforts to arrest it.  From 1992 to 2000, the forested portion of the basin plunged from 
66,096 ha to 38,384 ha.  The same period saw a 15,000 ha reduction in farmland due to 
conversion of land from agricultural to urban uses.  These processes have accelerated soil 
erosion, reducing the capacity of hillside and valley soils to absorb and retain water, thus 
aggravating both flooding problems and dry-season water scarcity. 
Increasing Water Demand 
Urbanization and industrialization in the Tárcoles basin has not entirely displaced 
agriculture, however.  According to one expert in the Ministry of Environment and Energy 
(MINAE - Ministerio del Ambiente y Energía), 60% of consumptive water use is for 
irrigated agriculture.  Urban and industrial water demands have grown on top of 
agricultural water use. This accumulation of water demands for urban, industrial, and 
agricultural needs has begun to be felt in shortages or uncertain availability of high-quality 
water supplies for newer, high-value sectors of the economy such as tourism, recreation, 
and fishing.  Some water is even imported to the upper basin area from the neighboring 
Reventazón river basin, for use in the GAM. 
Institutional Context 
This litany of difficulties is not new, and is familiar to several individuals and 
organizations in the basin.  Water policies in Costa Rica have contributed to the 
management challenges in the Tárcoles basin, however, more than they have alleviated 
them.  There is no national water policy and no national water plan; there is not even a 
national water budget more recent than 1990.  The existing national water law dates from 
1942, and modified the first regulation of 1884; a proposed new water law has been under 
consideration in the Costa Rican legislature for about two years. 
 The system of water concessions in the country has significant gaps that contribute 
to uncertainty about water availability, since it is hard to tell what uses are occurring 
already in the basin and to what extent total water demand exceeds or is exceeded by 
available supply.  The largest hydroelectric power producers (the national institute ICE 
and its subsidiary CNFL), which use the greatest quantities of surface water, are not 
included in the concession system. Also, the concession system provides little control over 
groundwater use.  Tariffs on agricultural water use are based on land area rather than on 
the volume of water used, providing little incentive for farmers to replace or upgrade 
aging and inefficient gravity-fed systems.  The entire system of water charges fails to 
provide enough revenue to maintain infrastructure within the basin, let alone support 
needed improvements such as water treatment plants.  Needless to say, this situation does 
not correspond to Costa Rica’s image of an ecologically–aware and active country. 
 Efforts to develop river basin management oriented toward integrated water 
resource management in the Tárcoles basin began in this institutional environment about 
15 years ago.  It was not a central-government initiative, but an effort begun by a small 
number of important basin stakeholders. 
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4.3 Major Stakeholders in the Tárcoles Basin  
Appendix 2 provides an extensive presentation of the identities, authority, and functions of 
several important organizations in the Tárcoles Basin.  Box 1 below condenses some of 
that information on the basin stakeholders that have been involved with the effort to create 
and sustain a Commission for the Río Grande de Tárcoles, some from its inception and 
others at times along the way.  The section that follows describes the river basin 
commission’s development. 
 
Box 1: Major Stakeholders 
 
Principal Water Providers 
The Institute of Aqueducts and Sewers (AyA – Instituto Costarricense de Acueductos y 
Alcantarillados): AyA, a state institute with functional and budgetary autonomy, was 
created by law in 1961.  It is authorized to design, finance, build and operate water supply 
systems created after that, and is responsible for water supply in the San José metropolitan 
area and several other locations.  It is also able to intervene and assume the operation of 
inefficient or poorly performing water supply systems.  AyA has a dual role as the 
country’s foremost water supplier but also as the regulatory authority for water supply 
systems in Costa Rica.  It is obliged to set policies, establish standards, conduct and 
promote planning, financing, administration and operation of water supply and sewerage 
systems, as well as regulations for stormwater drainage in the urban area.  Furthermore, 
despite being the regulatory authority for water and sewerage systems, AyA is also one of 
the major polluters in the Tárcoles basin because of the lack of treatment for its sewerage 
system which discharges to the surface waters of the basin. 
 
Municipalities 
These local governments are responsible for operating the water supply systems under 
their authority that existed prior to the creation of AyA, as long as they maintain a 
minimum level of quality and efficient service and obtain a concession from the national 
government for their water use.  In Costa Rica, many of the water supply systems that 
supply drinking water, especially in the outlying areas of the country, are in the hands of 
the municipality.  However, there has been a tendency toward the centralization of the 
service in the AyA, because of the poor service provided by the municipalities, which 
became evident when there were serious contamination accidents, interruption in the 
service, leaks and little development in the infrastructure.   The 1942 water law provides 
that municipalities will manage the water systems for their populations.  It also authorized 
municipalities to supervise and control concessions for the exploitation of materials (sand, 
rock, gravel and others) from rivers, beaches and deposits of public domain, but this was 
changed by the Code of Mining adopted in 1982. 
The Public Service Company of Heredia (ESPH - Empresa de Servicios Públicos de 
Heredia): The Public Service Company of Heredia (ESPH) was created in 1976 by a law 
that was modified in 1996.  It is a private company that provides the public services of 
water and electricity.  It has jurisdiction over the central canton of Heredia and 




Hydroelectric power producers 
The Costa Rican Electricity Institute (ICE - Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad) and 
its subsidiary the National Power and Light Company (CNFL): ICE, an institute with 
budgetary and functional autonomy, was created in 1949 to plan and conduct the rational 
development of energy for the country, especially from water resources.  ICE and CNFL 
have constructed a series of reservoirs for hydropower generation in various rivers in the 
basin, although ICE’s largest power projects have been in other basins in Costa Rica.  
Currently, 71% of electricity produced in Costa Rica is generated as hydropower.  
 
Private power producers  
ICE and CNFL are the dominant electricity producers in the Tárcoles basin, but since 
1992 Costa Rican law has allowed private companies to obtain permits and concessions to 
produce and sell electricity as well.  Because some of these companies pay environmental 
services fees and because they have an interest in the preservation and quality of surface 
water flows, they are interested in river basin management generally even though their 
involvement in the Tárcoles basin per se is limited.  The private power producers have an 
association (ACOPE - Asociación Costarricense de Productores de Energía) to represent 
their interests. 
 
Other Major Water Use Sectors 
 
Industry 
As already noted, industrial water use and waste discharges are important factors in the 
current conditions and future prospects of the Tárcoles basin.  Whether individually or 
through representation in the Chamber of Industries, businesses (especially manufacturing 
and food and beverage processing) are noteworthy stakeholders. 
 
Agriculture 
Similarly, irrigated agriculture is a major water use sector in the Tárcoles basin, and 
agricultural practices such as fertilizer use and runoff have impacts on water quality.  The 
agriculture sector participates in water policy matters primarily through the Costa Rica 
Chamber of Agriculture and Agribusiness and chambers or federations of particular 
agricultural sectors, such as the Federation of Livestock Chambers. 
 
Regulatory Bodies and Nongovernmental Organizations 
 
Ministry of Environment and Energy (MINAE): In 1996 in connection with a number of 
reforms of public services and reorganization of government agencies, it was decided that 
matters relating to water resources should be transferred to MINAE.  This reorganization 
at the central government level did not signal any significant decentralization of water 
management responsibilities.  As the central government agency with principal 
responsibility for environmental and natural resource management, including water, 
MINAE has considerable interest in the Tárcoles basin. 
 
National System of Conservation Areas (SINAC - Sistema Nacional de Areas de 
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Conservación): Costa Rica contains a number of protected areas that are designated on the 
basis of their ecological significance and/or vulnerability.  SINAC is the agency charged 
with the management of these protected areas, many of which are located around the 
periphery of the Tárcoles basin, mainly in the upstream basin area. 
 
Other ministries and agencies 
Either because water resources are part of their portfolio or because they regulate or 
support other basin stakeholders, a number of other governmental ministries and agencies 
should also be regarded as Tárcoles basin stakeholders.  They include the Ministry of 
Health (MINSA - Ministerio de Salud Pública), the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock 
(MAG - Ministerio de Agricultura y Ganadería), the Ministry of Planning (MIDEPLAN - 
Ministerio de Planificación Nacional y Política Económica), the Public Service 
Regulatory Agency (ARESEP - Autoridad Reguladora de Servicios Públicos), and the 
Institute for Municipal Promotion and Advising (IFAM - El Instituto de Fomento y 
Asesoría Municipal). 
 
Environmental and other NGOs 
 
There are several nongovernmental organizations oriented toward natural resource 
protection, sustainable urban development, or both.  Some have had representatives on the 
Tárcoles basin commission.  They include the Center for Environmental Law and Natural 
Resources (CEDERENA - Centro de Direcho Ambiental y de los Recursos Naturales), the 
Foundation for Urban Development (FUDEU - Fundación para el Desarrollo Urbano), 
and the Federation of Environmental Groups (FECON - Federación Costarricense de 
Conservación del Ambiente). 
 
5. The Tárcoles River Basin Commission 
Costa Rica has had a highly centralized form of government.  Decentralization efforts with 
regard to a number of public services have been isolated, and sometimes only temporary.  
River basin management has followed the same pattern; there has been no overall, 
nationwide effort to decentralize water resource management to the river basin level in 
Costa Rica.  The creation of the Coordinating Commission for the Río Grande de Tárcoles 
was the first effort in Costa Rica to establish a structure for river basin management.  
Interestingly, it represented more of a “bottom up” than a “top down” approach to 
establishing a river basin organization.3  Since then, basin organizations have been created 
in a few other river basins in the country. 
5.1 Origin and Emergence of the Basin Commission, 1991-1994 
In 1991, the Municipality of the Central Canton of San José—the most influential 
municipality in Costa Rica—began to pay attention to serious environmental problems 
that were apparent in the capital city, especially water pollution, the dumping of solid and 
                                                 
3 Although the expression “bottom-up” is often used to refer to actions initiated by grassroots or other civil-
society entities, we use it here somewhat more broadly, as the CRGT was initiated by local government 
officials and civic organizations together.  This use of the term “bottom-up” still contrasts accurately with a 
“top-down” decentralization initiative of the central government; CRGT was the former, not the latter. 
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liquid waste in the rivers, and the recurring problem of rivers and streams overflowing 
their banks, which has often caused serious tragedies.  When the municipality decided to 
tackle these issues, there was no organized opposition but also no organized support for it 
doing so.  It was unusual for municipalities to take action on such matters, so while San 
José’s efforts did not violate any formal restrictions on its authority, they did run against 
stereotypical views of municipal responsibilities. 
 To pursue its interest in these environmental quality-of-life issues, the municipality 
of San José initiated a series of activities in 1991 and 1992, of which the following four 
stand out: 
 In 1991 it proposed a Project for the Recuperation of the Río Torres.  This project 
focused on controlling the disposal of solid and liquid wastes in the Río Torres, a major 
upper-basin river and one of the most polluted rivers in the Tárcoles basin.  The Río 
Torres project was assisted with funding from France as part of the CIUDAGUA program. 
 Also in 1991, in another unusual action for a municipality, San José issued a 
municipal policy directive giving industries located in the canton 24 months to begin 
treating their liquid waste.  As a result of that directive, a pilot plan was launched by the 
Municipality and the Chamber of Industry involving a group of businesses that were major 
polluters according to data from AyA.  When the pilot program ended in 1994, there had 
been a significant reduction in industrial waste (Rodríguez, 1997). 
 In 1992, the Municipality of San José adopted an Urban Control Plan to regulate 
land use and urban growth, which included a series of environmental provisions to protect 
surface water, aquifers, and recharge areas. 
 By this time, though, officials and staff of the Municipality had come to recognize 
that these environmental matters could not be resolved by actions in only one canton.  The 
situation would have to be approached with a broader view, one that included the entire 
Tárcoles basin.  Visits were made to each of the other 35 municipalities in the river basin 
area to promote their participation and to set priorities.  In August 1992, the Municipality 
of San José organized a seminar titled, “The Río Grande de Tárcoles River Basin:  
Looking Toward the Future,” in which a large audience participated in discussions and 
defined some basic guidelines for coordination to confront the immense task of 
recuperating the river basin.   
 The August 1992 seminar’s most important achievement was its involvement of 
many basin stakeholders, including many of the municipalities, private businesses, and 
civil-society institutions.  After the seminar, with continued leadership and support from 
the Municipality of San José, negotiations began to form the Coordinating Commission 
for the Río Grande de Tárcoles, the CRGT. 
 The original members of the commission were: 
 
 A representative from each of the following municipalities:  San José, Heredia, 
San Rafael de Heredia, Orotina, Alajuela, and Curridabat. 
 A representative from each of the following ministries: Environment and Energy, 
National Planning and Economic Policy, Health, and Science and Technology. 
 A representative from each of the following state institutes: National Power and 
Light Company (CNFL), ICE, and AyA. 
 A university representative. 
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 Private-sector representatives from the following organizations: the Chamber of 
Industry, Costa Rica Chamber of Agriculture and Agribusiness, and the Federation 
of Livestock Chambers. 
 
 From its beginning, then, the CRGT had a participatory structure that was both 
inter-organizational and inter-disciplinary, attempting to connect the most important actors 
in water resource matters.  The structure was nevertheless imperfect, and some of its 
deficiencies are discussed later. 
 With this original composition, the stakeholders sought official recognition of the 
CRGT by the national government.  Rather than proceed through the more time-
consuming and politically difficult process of obtaining recognition through a law passed 
by the Costa Rican legislature, the stakeholders and the office of the Minister of the 
Environment agreed to use the swifter action of a ministerial decree recognizing the 
commission.  Although this choice expedited official recognition of the commission, it 
later proved somewhat regrettable, since ministerial decrees are more easily altered or 
disregarded by subsequent administrations than are national laws. 
 The CRGT was officially recognized on April 29, 1993 by Executive Decree No. 
22156-MIRENEM (MIRINEM being the previous acronym for what is now MINAE, the 
Ministry of Environment and Energy).  Although the decree recognized the CRGT’s 
legitimate existence as a collaborative body for information development and sharing, 
communication, and planning, it did not transfer to the CRGT any formal responsibility or 
capacity for undertaking water management projects. 
 In December 1993, a follow-up decree, Decree No. 22712-MIRENEM, was 
published adding representatives from the Municipal Institute for Promotion and 
Consultancy (IFAM) and the Foundation for Urban Development (FUDEU) as permanent 
members of the CRGT.  With these additions, the commission had 19 members, of which 
five were nongovernmental organizations and six were municipalities (Figure 2). 
Source: Ballestero (2003) 
 During 1993 and 1994, the CRGT conducted an awareness-raising campaign about 
river basin management.  There were motivational activities in the municipalities and with 
































businesses in order to involve them in the process.  A series of events were organized 
(seminars, workshops, meetings) that guaranteed a substantial participation by 
municipalities, NGOs, and private and public sectors.  These were held to create a 
framework for debate about common themes and were an endeavor to give clear 
information to all the actors.  More action-oriented seminars held during 1993 were titled, 
“Towards Integrated Management in the Río Grande de Tárcoles River Basin,” and 
“Institutional Tasks in the Río Grande de Tárcoles Basin.” 
 Throughout these first two years of the CRGT’s existence, the Municipality of San 
José continued to provide its principal leadership and support.  The CRGT had space in 
the offices of the municipality, and the municipality provided it with staff support to 
become operational as a commission.  The CRGT members and staff participated in 
training activities. 
5.2 Peak Activity, 1994-1998 
By 1994, the CRGT was operational and began conducting activities in the river basin.  
This was its most productive phase, during which there was substantial support from 
MINAE for the CRGT and for the creation of similar structures in other river basins.  
MINAE provided logistical and economic support for the CRGT, and devolved to it some 
basin planning and study functions (including contracting with the Inter-American 
Development Bank for a large-scale basin study) that would otherwise have been 
performed by MINAE personnel.  The headquarters of CRGT were transferred to space 
offered by MINAE, which was shared by other MINAE departments. 
 MINAE during this period also expressed support for the creation of similar 
structures in other river basins.  Executive Decree No. 26635-MINAE divided the country 
into five watersheds, created a favorable atmosphere for the deconcentration of services in 
them, and established authority to form organizations in the Tempisque, Bananito and 
Savegre rivers.  Also, in 1995 by Executive Decree 30077-MINAE, the River Basin 
Program was created as part of the National System of Conservation Areas for the purpose 
of determining guidelines for MINAE regulations regarding river basins and to formulate 
national policies for river basins.  Another objective of the decree was to elaborate a 
Master Plan for River Basins and to approve an order of priorities by river basin region for 
water use by public sector organizations, which was orientated to the integrated and 
rational utilization of the resource. 
 During 1994-1998, the CRGT was very active and demonstrated leadership on the 
national and international (regional) levels; it became a management “model” to be 
reproduced.  The CRGT was incorporated as a founding member of the International 
Network of River Basin Organizations in France in 1994, and into the Latin American 
Network of River Basin Organizations in Brazil in 1997.  With the support of the IDB and 
French Cooperation, the First Meeting on River Basin Organizations in Central America 
and the Caribbean was organized on May 1, 1997.The information and communication 
functions of the CRGT continued through this phase.  CRGT members and staff compiled 
and systematized information on water quality and pollution sources in the basin, studies 
on river basin characteristics, and institutional and legal analyses.  A number of other 
workshops and seminars were held during this period and brought stakeholders together.  
 The CRGT also implemented four major action programs during this period, 
which are described in Box 2.  A volunteer plan program was devised for businesses to 
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incorporate waste treatment, and an ecological flag program was created to recognize 
these and other efforts to protect and conserve water resources.  Reforestation programs 
were initiated to promote watershed protection. Lastly, the CRGT developed an ambitious 
program for the integrated management of natural resources at the basin scale. 
 
Box 2: Major Action Programs  
 
The Volunteer Plan Program 
It was formed after the passage of the Wildlife Conservation Law in October 1992, 
particularly Article 132, which prohibited discharging contaminated substances into 
bodies of water and set a 24-month deadline (December 1994) for compliance.  Seeking 
business cooperation through agreements with business sectors, the government invited 
businesses to present voluntary plans to establish waste treatment systems.  The Volunteer 
Plan Program originated by the CRGT grew beyond its expectations: about 100 businesses 
joined the program.  The biggest successes were with coffee processors, sugar cane mills 
and pig farms. Later, Executive Decree No. 24156 MIRENEM-SALUD, a joint decree of 
the ministries of Environment and Health, established Costa Rica’s first maximum and 
minimum parameters for disposal of contaminated substances into water bodies.  That 
decree was revised and updated, and a new version presented on June 19, 1997 (Executive 
Decree No. 26042 SALUD-MINAE). Because of the extent and national potential, the 
volunteer plan program was taken up again by MINAE in 1998, this time to be 
implemented by the ministry.  However, the ministry was not able to maintain the initial 
interest, and the program now operates at its lowest level of participation. 
The Ecological Flag Program 
The CRGT established the Ecological Flag Program in 1994 as a reward or recognition for 
business and civil-society organizations that had developed and implemented resource 
protection and recovery activities in the river basin.  The CRGT awarded the first 
Ecological Flags in February 1995 to companies that had successfully completed the pilot 
Volunteer Plan Program.  The initiative quickly gained nationwide attention.  Although it 
was paralyzed for a while in 1996 because of a lack of resources and technical equipment, 
the flag program returned in 1997 with support from the Dutch government and was 
renamed the “seal of environmental quality.”  In 2001, the program was transferred to the 
Office of Civil Society of MINAE, which is currently in charge of its administration for 
the entire country. 
 
Reforestation 
Reforestation programs were initiated to protect riverbanks, streams, springs, and forest 
lands threatened by landslides or erosion.  The CRGT conducted awareness-raising 
programs in elementary and high schools, in community organizations and with 
environmentalists in the different cantons of the Tárcoles basin.  As originally conceived, 
the program had three stages: cleanup, reforestation and maintenance.  Reforestation has 
been a readily measurable success, resulting in more than 150,000 trees being planted.  
Starting with the Municipality of San José, the CRGT implemented a practice of giving 
the mother of each newborn in the basin a tree seedling upon the birth of her child.  The 
program has used native species produced in a tree nursery that belongs to ICE, which 
donated the trees for the program under an agreement with the CRGT.  Currently, that 
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program is continued by the Municipality of San José, and other CRGT members—a few 
other municipalities and ICE and CNFL—have developed and maintained reforestation 
programs in various watersheds of the basin. 
 
Program for Integrated Management of Natural Resources 
The CRGT elaborated and requested funding from the Inter-American Development Bank 
(IDB) for a program for Integrated Management of Natural Resources in the Río Grande 
de Tárcoles River Basin.  This proposal represented the pinnacle of CRGT activity in 
attempting to achieve a basin-scale coordinated program of protection and recovery for 
water and other natural resources.  Although the proposal was endorsed by MINAE and 
the Ministry of Planning, it was presented to the IDB in 1994 by the CRGT rather than by 
a government agency.  In the nearly three-year process of negotiation, the CRGT was 
selected to be the national counterpart, the first time that IDB in Costa Rica worked with 
an organization of this kind.  IDB gave CRGT the responsibility to supervise and use 
$1,000,000 to design the program concept and to fund the development of feasibility 
studies.  Those studies, which began in October 1997 and concluded at the end of 1998, 
were performed by a North American company, ABT Associates, Inc., with local partners 
the Center for Tropical Research (CATIE), the Neotropical Foundation, and the COSESA 
Group. 
 
5.3 Diminution of Functions and Visibility, 1999-present 
At the beginning of 1999, a number of factors converged that began to make the normal 
operation of the Commission difficult.  A change of government occurred as the result of 
the national elections in 1998, and the new government took a more cautious and less 
generous approach to the support of the CRGT and its activities.  The new MINAE 
minister adopted the perspective that the ministry’s responsibility was to enforce and 
implement national laws, not to go beyond the scope of existing laws by decreeing or 
supporting projects and initiatives of its own.  On this score, the vulnerability of the 
CRGT as an initiative established by decree rather than by law became apparent.  The new 
MINAE minister began to rein in the CRGT by taking a more active and direct role in its 
governance and operations, in what several interviewees described as the “centralizing” or 
“re-centralizing” of the Commission.  A newly-appointed MINAE representative to the 
CRGT was named by the minister as the Commission’s president, without consultation of 
the rest of the CRGT members and even though he had no previous involvement in the 
CRGT or other river basin management efforts. 
 Not only did this change reflect a new relationship between the central government 
and the CRGT, it also demonstrated to the rest of the commission members the importance 
of the skills and role of the CRGT’s first and only previous president.  He had been a town 
councillor in the Municipality of San José who had spearheaded the development of the 
municipality’s efforts to attend to environmental issues and the development of the CRGT, 
had substantial entrepreneurial skills, and had been able to mobilize and combine people 
and resources to make the CRGT an active body despite its multi-organizational structure 
and its somewhat uncertain status as a kind of institution recognized by the national 
government but lacking formal governmental powers.  The first president also had and 
used an extensive network of contacts with people at the top decision-making levels of 
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other key institutions such as MINAE.  CRGT had come into existence and flourished 
under those conditions, but it diminished quickly after he ceased to be its leader. 
 The new MINAE representative’s tenure as CRGT president was short-lived, and 
he left the post in 2000.  The presidency was assumed at that time by the representative of 
the Union of Local Governments, who had been providing some leadership in CRGT 
activities.  He had been openly critical of the CRGT’s changed direction and changed 
relationship with MINAE, being quoted as follows in the press on his disappointment with 
a CRGT seminar held in 2000: “After 10 years, all they did was tell us that the river is 
polluted, that there’s deforestation, that we have a sewage problem…. I was expecting 
something concrete with a series of local and regional projects.”  This local government 
representative had also observed that since MINAE had assumed direction of the CRGT 
they had failed to keep it active and progressing, and participation in the commission by 
local governments was dwindling (Dulude 2000).  
 In late 2001, MINAE reasserted control and replaced the Union of Local 
Governments representative as CRGT president with a MINAE official.  This designation 
again occurred without consultation of the rest of the CRGT.  The MINAE official 
remains at this time the CRGT coordinator, and is also the MINAE’s Director of National 
Environmental Programs, a very busy post that consumes considerable time and energy.  
The additional duty as CRGT president is on top of those other functions and without any 
additional resources.  With considerable effort, the MINAE representative has kept the 
CRGT alive, but it is clearly functioning at a quite minimal level.  It is not clear how much 
participation in the CRGT is still committed by the member organizations and agencies.  
Indeed, in interviews with several individuals who are currently designated as 
representatives to the CRGT, there was a startling difference of views on even the most 
mundane of questions such as how often the Commission meets and when it last met.  
Some interviewees said the Commission continues to meet regularly on a bimonthly basis, 
but others said the Commission has not met in over a year and perhaps nearly two years. 
 This recent MINAE CRGT president’s office has undertaken some activities in the 
name of the CRGT, e.g., some research and actions intending to implement economic 
instruments to promote pollution control, but even some CRGT members were not aware 
that these were CRGT actions.  Moreover, there appears to have been little or no interest 
on MINAE’s part in following up on the Integrated Natural Resources Management 
Program for the basin, despite the Interamerican Development Bank’s investment of 
$1,000,000 in the 1997-98 study mentioned above. 
 
6. Participants’ Motivations and Incentives 
One of the most intriguing questions about the Tárcoles basin case is what motivated the 
creation of the river basin commission in the first place.  The municipality of San José, 
and one official therein, Hubert Mendez, took the lead in convening the initial meetings 
and workshops that led to the formation of the CRGT.  Based on the background paper 
(Ballestero 2003) and interviews conducted for this project, there appear to be at least 
three elements of motivation that spurred the municipal government and Mr. Mendez to 
take these steps.  One is Mr. Mendez’ own commitment to the issue of environmentally 
sustainable urban development, which apparently led him to the issue of maintaining or 
restoring urban rivers such as those that flow through the upper basin and form the Rio 
Grande de Tárcoles.  Even after leaving his post with the municipality he has continued to 
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work with and for non-governmental organizations involved with this issue, so it is fair to 
infer that it is a topic of genuine personal significance to him.  A second element is the 
interest of Mr. Mendez and other San José area officials to turn attention toward quality-
of-life issues after the metropolitan population surpassed a million people and further 
growth became intertwined with issues of housing, sanitation, congestion, and so on—
water quality and reliable water availability are among those quality of life issues.  A third 
element was the need and desire of San José officials to reach beyond the jurisdictional 
borders of their own municipality.  Trash, sewage, agricultural runoff, and industrial waste 
in the rivers affect the quality of life in San José but do not all originate in San Joséthere.  
Creating a cross-jurisdictional entity such as a river basin commission was a means of 
raising awareness and influencing actions in neighboring jurisdictions and in the private 
sector and civil society. 
 The other jurisdictions and private sector or civil society organizations that 
participated in the formation and early years of the CRGT appear to have done so partly 
because of Mr. Mendez’ entrepreneurial skills.  Other motivations include concerns about 
sustaining growth in the basin outside of San José (e.g., industries hoping to expand their 
operations in the valley needed to have assurances of reliable water supplies of usable 
quality), and a desire to have some influence in regulatory decision making and programs 
concerning the basin.  Without a basin commission, local government officials and private 
sector or civil society organizations would most likely be on the receiving end of central 
government policy rather than helping to shape it, as is evident in the period of the 
CRGT’s decline. 
 This motivation of influencing policy making is particularly visible in the 
participation of the institutes AyA and ICE, the two largest stakeholders in the Tárcoles 
basin in terms of water use and waterpolicymaking.  Both have been represented in the 
Tárcoles commission and participated regularly in it.  These are nationwide entities with 
considerable political as well as economic clout, so it is not intuitively obvious why they 
would participate in a modestly-resourced consortium such as CRGT.  Furthermore, they 
would understandably have some misgivings about having to deal with a number of river 
basin commissions throughout the country, and thus may not fully embrace a 
decentralization effort.  Both AyA and ICE are extremely important at the national level 
and quite politically influential, so a basin commission such as the one in Tárcoles is 
unlikely to proceed rapidly toward autonomy and authority unless AyA and ICE 
acquiesce, or unless their reluctance is overwhelmed by central-government commitment 
to decentralization, neither of which is currently the case. 
 AyA has a great deal of regulatory and operational responsibility, which could 
weaken if a river basin commission were to be developed.  AyA understandably wants to 
maintain its dual role as Costa Rica’s principal water/wastewater service provider and 
regulator.  Doing so would mean participating in a river basin commission effort rather 
than allowing a commission to develop without AyA involvement and possibly obtain or 
gradually accumulate one of those roles.  Furthermore, since AyA is also a huge source of 
sewage discharges to the surface waters of the Tárcoles basin, it has incentives to 
participate in river basin management efforts that might lead to measures such as penalties 
for sewage dumping or subsidies for sewage treatment.  This combination of motives on 
AyA’s part helps to explain why AyA would want to participate in the CRGT when it was 
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new and as it grew, but did not object strongly when the CRGT declined and was folded 
into MINAE. 
 ICE, which manages not only hydropower but Costa Rica’s telecommunications 
sector, also has a stake in participating in river basin management to have their interests 
clearly represented.  ICE established a watershed unit for the Reventazón basin to promote 
regular flows.  Their interest in alleviating sediment buildup through preventive measures 
suggests why the Tárcoles basin commission, which was primarily interested in water 
quality, has not been a similar priority for them.   Private hydropower producers 
represented by ACOPE, and the Public Service Company of Heredia, would like to see the 
larger public hydroelectric producers (ICE and CNFL) brought into the system of water 
use concessions and tariffs.  ICE and CNFL would prefer to avoid this, and have argued 
persuasively that concessions would negatively impact investments and that tariffs would 
increase costs to customers.  They cannot be too obstructionist, though, because ICE and 
CNFL have to maintain enough political support to keep their special position in national 
law and policy compared with the private producers.  National policy makers might well 
prefer to have the revenue and control that would follow from bringing ICE and CNFL 
into the water tariff and concession systems—after all, national policy makers did require 
concessions and tariffs from the private producers as conditions of letting them into the 
market. 
 Finally there is the question of MINAE’s motivations.  MINAE officials want to 
maintain control of the water resource “pillar” of national environmental policy, for at 
least two discernible reasons.  One is the obvious bureaucratic reason of seeking to 
maintain control over an important policy topic and the governmental resources that are 
devoted to it.  The other is more subtle.  At least some MINAE officials accept that 
integrated water resource management on some sort of regional scale (river basin or 
otherwise) is desirable, but would prefer to develop and implement such policies and 
practices for the nation as a whole rather than piecemeal.  The Tárcoles basin in particular 
is much too important a basin for MINAE to leave autonomous—rather, whatever 
MINAE officials want to replicate elsewhere in the country needs to be the case in the 
Tárcoles basin, and vice versa. 
 
7. Performance Assessment 
As already noted in Section 5.2, the Tárcoles basin commission was for a period in the 
1990s able to initiate and lead important basin improvement activities.  Agribusiness 
contamination of water, especially from coffee processing operations, was reduced 
through the Voluntary Plan Program.  Although forest and farm land are still being lost to 
urbanization—aggravating erosion, flooding, runoff and contamination problems—
reforestation efforts championed by the basin commission certainly helped slow the 
degradation by as many as 150,000 trees. 
 As described in Section 5.3, changes of leadership at the CRGT and its changed 
relationship with MINAE—a change that resulted in more central government control but 
less central government support—are associated with a decline of CRGT activity, 
visibility, and stakeholder participation.  A number of basin management issues remain 
unaddressed and unresolved in the aftermath of that change. 
 The Tárcoles river basin still lacks sewage treatment, and river water quality 
conditions therefore continue to worsen as the basin population grows.  Septic tanks used 
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by many households and businesses in the basin are not being replaced with a sewage 
collection and treatment system, and groundwater quality is increasingly threatened as a 
result of septic systems as well as agricultural and industrial water and land uses.  
Industrial waste treatment occurs in some locations in the basin, but coverage remains 
incomplete. 
 The water rights system in Costa Rica inhibits effective demand management.  The 
current concession system does not cover groundwater use, or surface water use by public 
hydroelectric suppliers.  ICE, as noted, has been outside the surface-water concession 
system despite being the largest surface water user.  This is explained on the basis of 
ICE’s status as a state institute, but also on the grounds that hydropower use is non-
consumptive.  Both rationales are defensible, but the exemption creates political difficulty 
in getting other surface water users to accept registration, limitations, and tariffs on their 
water use.  The tariff system for agricultural water use continues to impose fees based on 
cultivated area rather than metered water use, providing no economic incentive in favor of 
efficient water use.  Furthermore, groundwater use appears to be subject to no control 
whatsoever though there is evidence of overdraft in the San José area. 
 The shortcomings in the preceding paragraph are of course national policy 
problems in Costa Rica, not limited to the Tárcoles basin.  They contribute nevertheless to 
the delay in improving basin conditions, regardless of the tenuous status and institutional 
position of the river basin commission. 
 Finally, though, it needs to be pointed out that the Tárcoles basin experience has 
led to greater participation of a number of segments of society in water-related issues. This 
in itself is an achievement in a traditionally centralized country. It also has had a certain 
influence on the strides made towards the new Costa Rican water law and towards basin 
management approaches in other basins.  
 
8. Application of the Analytical Framework to the Tárcoles Case 
As noted at the beginning of this paper, the Tárcoles basin case has been extremely 
valuable to this research project, because the formation of the basin commission occurred 
in the fairly recent memory of many individuals who are still actively involved in water 
and government.  This distinguishes the Tárcoles case from those of older basin 
organizations such as the Guadalquivir and Murray-Darling basins.  Furthermore, 
formation of the river basin commission in the Tárcoles case appears to have occurred as a 
result of local-level efforts rather than a nationwide decentralization or basin management 
initiative of the central government.  Central government support of the Tárcoles 
commission was essential to its emergence, but the Tárcoles case nevertheless stands apart 
from cases such as the Warta basin in Poland where the central government decided to 
create a set of basin management authorities throughout the country in a single initiative.  
Noting these differences, we turn now to our analytical framework to highlight some key 
variables that appear to be associated with the CRGT’s trajectory thus far. 
8.1 Initial Conditions and Contextual Factors 
Costa Rica would have to be characterized as a country that is still developing, but which 
has proceeded on a very successful path.  Even with a 500% increase in population over 
the past half-century, gains have been made in household income, education levels, etc.  
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Literacy rates and life expectancy are at developed-nation levels, and Costa Rica has 
developed a sizable middle class. Economic growth has been accompanied by a stable 
political system for the past half-century.  Thus, economic development of the nation does 
not place integrated water resource management and the development of active river basin 
management entirely out of reach, but financial resources are still quite limited compared 
with the tasks at hand. 
 Within Costa Rica the Tárcoles basin is by far the most economically developed in 
the country, and one might well say that if successful river basin management were to be 
implemented in Costa Rica, the Tárcoles would have been as promising a site as any.  Nor 
do there appear to be substantial cultural or religious differences across groups of basin 
stakeholders that would dramatically inhibit prospects for cooperation.  On the other hand, 
the Tárcoles is also the basin with the most extreme problems in the country, and where 
the financial resources necessary to really fix the problems are beyond the reach not only 
of the basin organization but of the country at present.  Moreover, the Tárcoles basin is 
politically important for the country and how it is managed reflects upon national policy, 
which is inconclusive to date.  Some interlocutors for the study pointed out that there are 
forces in Costa Rica that try to push for decentralization of decision making in a variety of 
realms, but the centralized culture is as yet too strong for this to succeed. This overall 
reluctance towards decentralization to lower levels of decision making is also reflected in 
the Tárcoles basin. Nevertheless, more recent river basin organization efforts within Costa 
Rica, specifically in the Reventazón and Tempisque basins, appear to be making more 
headway than the Tárcoles. These, however, are smaller and less important and incentives 
to keep things as they are may be less strong.  
8.2 Decentralization Process 
The origins of the CRGT fit closer to the locally initiated effort and mutually desired 
devolution categories than a shedding or abandonment of central-government 
responsibilities.  Officials at the municipality of San José understood that their water 
quality problems were related to other municipalities, making a river basin approach most 
appropriate. They took the initiative to create the CRGT, and they founded FUDEU to be 
able to receive funds and apply them to water resource management issues on behalf of 
the commission. Local leadership initiated the efforts to address basin problems, and 
central government officials were supportive and provided some help initially and 
substantial support during the years of peak CRGT activity. 
 Central government recognition of the local-level basin governance effort turned 
out to be problematic, however.  This was not because of central-government reluctance to 
recognize and support basin-level efforts, but a tactical choice by basin stakeholders and 
central government officials that later proved unfortunate.  Recognition of the basin 
commission by ministerial decree (rather than by a law enacted by the Costa Rica 
legislature) was simpler and quicker—a tactical choice of a path of lesser resistance.  
However, after the change of control of government in 1998, the new government’s 
ministry balked at carrying out activities not formally authorized by law, which placed the 
central government’s support for the Tárcoles commission in doubt. 
 There are also a number of weaknesses and incongruities in the decree that created 
the CRGT and its operating regulations, which became a burden to the commission later.  
The most important of these are: 
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 The decree, by being an instrument of lower rank than a law, cannot confer 
management responsibilities to the CRGT.  This created a gap between the objectives for 
which the CRGT was created and the structure that was set up to reach those objectives.  
Since the CRGT lacks legal capacity, it cannot officiate at any kind of legal ceremony or 
sign contracts in its own name, and it cannot directly manage its resources.  This reduces 
its autonomy, as well as its operational capability, and seriously limits its scope as a river 
basin organization.  To resolve these deficiencies, CRGT has had to count on an 
“executive arm” that gives it greater operational capability, such as the search for and 
channeling of resources and the execution of projects.  Two NGOs close to the 
commission have given that support.  The first is ASOCUENCAS, an association 
consisting of members of the commission and, since 1996, FUDEU.  This arrangement 
has been functional, but suboptimal.  In practice, the CRGT constitutes a space for 
meeting and discussion to coordinate the actions that different institutions and social 
sectors are conducting in the river basin.  
 The decree does not set a budget for the commission’s operations and does not 
define any other method of funding or of providing resources.  This becomes a major 
obstacle to assuming a leading role in river basin management. 
The responsibilities and roles of the agencies that compose the CRGT were not defined.  
What resulted was irregular support by public and private officials, and to a large measure 
the commission depended on their good will.  Likewise, the representatives of the public 
sector did not have decision-making power and could not make major commitments. 
 The representation, although it may have made sense initially, proved later to be 
less appropriate and was not able to adapt well to redress those gaps.  For example, by 
determining that one of the permanent positions from the NGO sector would always be 
occupied by FUDEU, and by deciding that six representatives (always the same 
municipalities) would represent all 36 municipalities in the basin without any rotation or 
election of those representatives, a lack of interest and some levels of distrust and criticism 
arose over time from the other municipalities and NGOs.  A rotating membership that 
would have allowed other NGOs and other municipalities to have representatives on the 
CRGT for certain periods might have encouraged a greater level of commitment from 
them and a better degree of coordination with their activities.  A municipality such as San 
Antonio de Belén, for instance, which has been a pioneer in environmental actions 
especially with water, did not know about projects that were being conducted by the 
CRGT, and instead developed water related programs of its own that could have been 
included in the program of the Commission.  
 In addition, according to the ABT evaluation (1998), there were no and are no 
channels for feedback or adequate coordination with the municipalities and NGOs that 
lacked representation, even though the Tárcoles basin contains the largest number of such 
organizations in Costa Rica.  A number of entities that were aware that there was a 
commission nevertheless did not become a part of the process.   
 The ineffectiveness of creating this kind of structure without a solid legal basis and 
financial support was assessed, and consequently in 2000 a law was issued creating Costa 
Rica’s first legally recognized river basin organization: the Commission for the Regulation 
and Management of the Río Reventazón River Basin. 
 An important variable is the stability of central government policy commitment to 
basin management through transitions in central government control.  The central 
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government’s support of the CRGT’s development and activities was not continued by the 
government that took office after the 1998 elections.  This appears to have been a major 
factor in stalling the progress of the basin commission in the Tárcoles since 1998. 
 It has even been contended that the central government since 1999 has taken 
actions with respect to river basin management that have undermined the work of 
previously established groups such as CRGT.  A National River Basin Network was 
created by MINAE decree in November 2000, with the following objectives: provide 
policy guidelines within the framework of river basin management; identify the needs for 
cooperation according to priority levels; promote the creation of a data base and 
information exchange at the national and regional levels; and encourage activities directed 
to raising awareness in civil society about the importance of conservation and the 
protection of river basins, among other things.  This network is integrated by 
representatives from the following agencies: CATIE, CEDARENA, CNFL, Costa Rican 
Federation of Environmental Groups (FECON), AyA, ICE, IFAM, ITCR, MAG, MINAE, 
MIDEPLAN, MINSA, SENARA, UCR and UNA.  Despite the overlap between these 
organizations in the National River Basin Network and the CRGT, the CRGT is not itself 
part of the Network.  The absence from the national network of the commission for the 
country’s most important river basin is puzzling, at the very least. 
 River basin management in Costa Rica is now widely perceived to be an issue 
under MINAE’s authority and direction.  This perception, in addition to the current 
government’s lack of commitment to the issue, has served to marginalize the past efforts 
of the CRGT. 
8.3 Central-Local Relationships and Capacities 
The CRGT was essentially a municipal initiative and took on a bold leadership role. The 
central government partially devolved authority, and was supportive of the CRGT’s 
efforts, but there was never a full recognition of the CRGT’s authority to manage the 
basin. Since 1998 the central government has neither pushed the devolution forward nor 
terminated the commission.  It has kept the commission alive while rethinking and shifting 
focus concerning environmental and natural resource policy aspects.  Thus, neither a 
complete handover nor a complete abandonment has resulted. 
 Financial resources for the basin management effort have always been limited, and 
CRGT has never had its own revenue stream.  As such, CRGT has always had to rely 
upon the kindness of friends if not strangers.  This has severely limited the commission’s 
ability to evolve into something more than a meeting place. 
 With regard to basin participants’ authority to create/modify institutional 
arrangements, there seems to be a problem that may be related to a larger issue of the 
difference between a common-law framework and a canon-law framework.  Several of the 
individuals we spoke with, from all kinds of government, business, and civil-society 
sectors, seemed to be trying to figure out what they are allowed to do, or who is allowed to 
take what actions, as though action is frozen in place until a clear signal is provided from 
above about how to proceed. 
 Cantons and municipalities do perform a number of functions, so there appears to 
be local-level experience with self-governance and service provision, rather than an 
excessive centralization of public services.  According to Article 169 of the Constitution, 
municipalities are autonomous and have complete authority to administer their territory. 
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However, they are limited in their exercise of authority.   Municipalities have neither the 
fiscal autonomy nor the funding from the central government to carry out their 
responsibilities very effectively.  Up to and including 2002, the revenue of municipalities 
represented less than 1% of the GDP and less than 2% of the total public expenditure, 
despite the importance they are given by the legal ordinances.  This lack of resources and 
capacity at the local level, with no authority in an intermediate level of governance, 
reflects the generally high level of centralization in Costa Rica.   
 Before 1950, the municipality law specifically stated the activities of 
municipalities.  That was replaced with a new municipality law in 1986 that takes 
basically a home-rule approach, which is that municipalities may do anything the law does 
not forbid. This also meant that they could relinquish responsibilities to the state.  In the 
area of water management and water quality protection (perhaps because they are 
regarded as relating to the larger area of ecological protection, requiring coordination 
across local boundaries), there has been central government and national institute 
dominance in the recent past, leaving local level governments less well acquainted with 
this portfolio.  In the past five years, AyA has assumed many of the planning and water 
supply functions of municipalities.   
 Discussion of how to strengthen local government and decentralize Costa Rica’s 
system has been under way in earnest for more than 20 years, with various legislative 
proposals introduced in the national legislature.  Recently, these efforts have begun to bear 
fruit, with the establishment of a new Municipal Code in 1998 that among other things 
provides for the direct election of mayors (which occurred for the first time in December 
2002), and the approval in 2001 of a constitutional amendment assigning 10% of the 
revenue of the regular budget to the municipalities. 
 The ability of any river basin commission in Costa Rica to develop and implement 
effective water supply management policies is likely to be hampered by the weak 
framework of water rights allocation.  There is a consensus now that it is necessary to 
have a legal framework to regulate water, and in 1998 a process was initiated, promoted 
by diverse sectors, to approve a new General Water Law.  Different actors (MINAE, 
Ombudsman’s Office and others) presented various proposals to the Costa Rican 
legislature.  All of these included, to varying degrees and with various approaches, the 
decentralization of water administration and the formation of local structures.  At the time 
of this study, there was a single text in discussion by the national legislature. 
 The Tárcoles basin commission has existed for more than a decade, which should 
have given it adequate time for implementation and adaptation. However, the central 
government’s treatment of it changed substantially about halfway through that period, and 
uncertainty and lack of resources have plagued it since.  Thus, the basin commission has 
been unable to make significant changes to its own internal structure and operations to 
improve basin management over time. 
8.4 Internal Basin-Level Institutional Arrangements 
Because the CRGT’s development changed paths so substantially between its first five 
years and the most recent five years, it is not clear how to apply all the variables identified 
in the analytical framework concerning the basin-scale institutional arrangements, but 
some of them do have applicability in this case study.  Structural matters, such as the 
mistakes made when creating the internal structure of the CRGT, which led to its 
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exhaustion and its loss of credibility, are clearly of this type.  Once it lost its central 
government support and its dynamic initial leadership, the CRGT’s status and composition 
left it vulnerable to becoming more of a discussion forum than a governing body.  
 Efforts to match the basin boundaries appear to have proceeded fairly well.  The 
real difficulty lies in identifying who is responsible for what in the Tárcoles basin. The 
prevailing and traditional view that water has to be managed by its uses (drinking, 
irrigation, hydropower, etc) rather than in an integrated fashion has been reflected and 
reinforced by Costa Rican laws.  There is considerable fragmentation and territorialism 
among agencies and institutes at the central government level.  Likewise, at the local level, 
there is little interjurisdictional cooperation and coordination among municipalities, which 
have been gaining interest in entering water planning and water service business activities.   
 That there was little recognition of sub-watershed communities of interest has been 
one of the few criticisms directed at the basin commission by those who were and are 
sympathetic to it.  One interviewee mentioned that the upper, middle, and lower basin 
areas entail “three different realities” with very different interests.  This is a well-
recognized issue among stakeholders, and a bone of contention for how water resource 
management should be organized.  One of the principal recommendations being 
considered by the ministry about how to proceed and how to restructure the basin 
commission was to establish upper, middle, and lower basin groups (mini-commissions) 
within the overall commission.  
 The basin commission’s greatest strength was to serve as a forum for information 
sharing and communication, but this appears to have waned substantially since its time of 
peak activity.  Some individuals who had been active participants in the commission 
indicated that they would welcome its revival but that they have stopped attending for now 
either because they are unaware of meetings or because they do not see much point in 
going.  Instead, basin stakeholders seem to have sector-based fora for information sharing 
(e.g., union of municipalities, chamber of industries, chamber of agriculture, etc.), which 
may serve operational purposes, but are not conducive to development of an agenda of 
basin activities. 
 Given Costa Rica’s size and the centrality of the Tárcoles basin, national entities 
(ministries and institutes) do most of the monitoring, as evidenced in the State of the 
Nation project which compiles data from these sources into comprehensive reports.  There 
was not much evidence of institutionalized monitoring of the Tárcoles basin per se.  The 
1997-98 study paid for by IDB and led by ABT Associates remains the most recent effort 
at a comprehensive picture of the basin and its conditions. 
8.5 Other Factors 
In each case study, there have been important factors relating to the emergence and 
success of basin management that were not envisioned in our analytical framework.  This 
is in the nature of research on institutions, which are always shaped by particular contexts 
and therefore exhibit unanticipated or idiosyncratic features.  In this case, at least two 
additional factors in Costa Rica have shaped the outcomes in the Tárcoles basin so far. 
 One factor is the relatively large number of separately identifiable river basins in a 
relatively small (geographically speaking) country.   The Tárcoles basin is only one of 34 
identified river basins in Costa Rica.  In light of the country’s modest size, there is 
substantial difference of opinion about the appropriate scale on which to try to organize 
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integrated water resource management.  Several individuals we interviewed expressed 
skepticism about the feasibility and sustainability of crafting basin management 
arrangements for each river basin in the country—i.e., whether it made sense for a country 
like Costa Rica to have 34 river basin management systems.  On the other hand, these 
individuals did not agree with one another about what would be a better regional basis for 
organizing river basin management. 
 Furthermore, the Costa Rican government has been trying to determine whether 
and how to coordinate integrated water resource management with other ecological and 
natural resource policies that are organized on different territorial bases.  Apart from the 
general jurisdictions of provinces, cantons, and municipalities, Costa Rica has systems of 
national parks and protected areas, which have recently been organized into a national 
system of conservation areas.  The country has been divided into the eleven Conservation 
Areas managed by SINAC, and these do not coincide with the river basin boundaries or 
with the provincial divisions.  In the late 1990s when MINAE was restructured and the 
Conservation Areas were defined, the possibility of setting the borders of those areas 
based on the borders of the main river basins was suggested, but that did not happen 
because of a lack of consensus among the political actors at that time. 
 The relevance of this point to the Tárcoles case is simply that the inconsistent and 
hesitant nature of central government support for basin management in the Tárcoles basin 
may not end until some clear view emerges among national-level policy makers about 
how to proceed with river basin management organization.  This raises once again the 
question of the “lowest appropriate level” for water resource management.  We heard 
people advocate organizing management around the 34 river basins in the country, 
consolidating the 34 basins into four or five hydrographic regions, strengthening the water 
management responsibilities and powers of the 81 municipalities (or 88 including the 7 
semi-municipalities), and working at subbasin levels to address specific shared problems. 
 The other factor is a cultural dimension shaped by Costa Rica’s physical 
circumstances and historical evolution.  In a humid setting with abundant precipitation, 
combined with (until recently) a small population and economy to sustain, Costa Rica 
developed a mostly unwritten but nevertheless widely understood and shared view of 
water as essentially free and plentiful.  Several interviewees recalled growing up in a 
country that was understood (even in school curricula) to be blessed with an essentially 
limitless supply of water.  Many have tolerated the poor water quality of the Tárcoles and 
have not considered addressing this problem as a particularly urgent matter in the face of 
other pressing priorities. Only recently has it become clear that water can be a limiting 
factor in Costa Rica’s future economic development and quality of life, but only a subset 
of the population sees it this way.  The cultural perception of water abundance and the 
lack of a sense of crisis place invisible but nonetheless significant political constraints on 
policy makers’ ability and willingness to embrace more restrictive water rights laws and 
higher water tariffs, both of which may be essential institutional steps toward more 
sustainable water policy in Costa Rica, whether organized at the river basin scale or 
otherwise.  In the Tárcoles case in particular, this perception contributes to weak controls 
on water uses and inadequate revenue with which to address the pollution problems in the 
basin.  A considerable public education effort will be necessary as part of any attempt to 




The Tárcoles basin case provides a useful example of the vulnerabilities of bottom-up 
initiatives for river basin management.  Such initiatives often lack a well-defined legal role 
and mandate.  They may be dependent upon higher levels of government for funding and 
technical support, and thus become vulnerable to political changes that shift governmental 
control and policy direction.  They also may lack the authority to undertake cross-
boundary efforts to resolve basinwide problems and conflicts.  The CRGT’s experience 
exhibited all of these characteristics. 
 More specifically, important features associated with the Tárcoles case appear to 
be: 
 
 The start-up of the commission in a bottom-up format initiated by some of the 
large stakeholders was initially very successful and quickly showed a number of 
results, indicating the possibilities for basin management. Nevertheless, it was 
heavily reliant on high-level support. 
 The central government’s commitment to river basin management generally, and 
in the Tárcoles basin in particular, has been uneven and inconsistent. This was 
especially evident with a change in government and is not unusual, especially in 
developing countries.  
 The basin management approach had a strong champion. Once the champion left 
(and the above-mentioned political changes took place) the still young and fragile 
institutional set-up got stalled and relatively ineffectual. 
 The severity of problems in the basin, and the difficulty of marshaling the financial 
resources to address them, stretch the management challenges beyond the 
capabilities of local action without sustained commitment of central government or 
external support. 
 Flaws in the basin organization structure and authority kept it from exercising 
autonomous authority to govern basin management, and diminished the 
commitment of some important local actors to it. 
 The past and current water rights established in the water law have been notably 
unhelpful to integrated water resource management in the Tárcoles or other basins 
and it is not clear if the Tárcoles experience has helped reshape these laws. 
However, other basins have learned from the Tárcoles basin and adopted different 
approaches. 
 The biggest water interests are national-scale and have their own agenda. They 
either must have incentives to participate (which they currently do not have) or 
Government must act more forcefully if it wants to promote better riverbasin 
management. 
 Pollution may not be perceived as acutely as a problem as water scarcity in other 
contexts, so that the political pressure to deal with the issue is relatively low. 
 
 The current situation in the administration of water resources in Costa Rica 
remains characterized by fragmentation and dispersion of responsibilities in a large 
number of institutions, several of which operate on a national scale.  At least 15 agencies 
are involved in local and national water administration.  As a result, there are serious 
problems in the distribution of responsibilities, with overlaps in some areas and vacuums 
 30
in others.  There is no coordination between these institutions, and their systems of 
administration differ.  They were created to fulfill specific functions (irrigation, drinking 
water supply, hydroelectric generation, sanitation, etc.) and lack an outlook that envisions 
an integral approach to water resource management.    Contributing to this fragmentation 
are the absence of a supervisory agency and a national water resource policy.  Even 
though the law designates the supervision of this resource to MINAE, that ministry has 
limited its responsibility to granting concessions, giving permits to exploit superficial and 
underground water and to establishing and collecting fees for such use. 
 Despite the fact that MINAE is responsible for supervising water resources, in 
2002 the National Water Council was formed by Executive Decree No. 30653-S-MAG-
MINAE-MEIC, and charged with the “harmonization of water legislation and the 
coordination of research, uses, development, utilization and conservation of water in the 
different departments and institutions of the state.”  The Ministry of Public Health, an 
agency with responsibilities for water quality, pollution and health, was appointed to 
coordinate this Council, which has created distortions and overlapping roles for both 
ministries.  The formation of this Council is a product of the leadership vacuum created by 
MINAE as the supervisory agency, is a temporary measure, and is no substitute for an 
adequate institutional framework for integrated water resource management. 
 There is hope, nonetheless, for a reversal of these processes.  There is an ongoing 
process to reform the legal and institutional water framework in the country.  The 
weaknesses and strengths of the CRGT have become fairly known, as are their failures 
and successes.  And through the past decade, the different actors have accumulated 
experience in water resource management and can encourage a process of integrated 
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Appendix: Variables in the Analytical Framework 
As noted in Section 2, the analytical framework used for this research project entails 
several variables hypothesized to be related to the success or failure of river basin 
management institutions, grouped into four categories. 
 
Contextual factors and initial conditions 
The literature on decentralized water resource management indicates that successful 
decentralization is at least partly a function of the initial conditions that prevail at the time 
a decentralization initiative is attempted.  These initial conditions are elements of the 
social context of the decentralization effort.  They include 
 
 Economic development of the nation; 
 Economic development of the basin area; 
 Initial distribution of resources among basin stakeholders; and 
 Class, religious, or other social/cultural distinctions among basin stakeholders. 
Characteristics of the decentralization process 
In countries that have attempted to decentralize water resource management to the basin 
level, characteristics of the decentralization process itself will affect the prospects for 
successful implementation.  Two necessary conditions of a decentralization initiative are 
(a) devolution of authority and responsibility from the center, and (b) acceptance of that 
authority and responsibility by the local or regional units.  Whether (a) and (b) occur will 
depend in part upon why and how the decentralization takes place.  Important factors 
include: 
 
 Whether basin-level management was a local initiative to assume management 
responsibilities, a devolution that was mutually desired by local stakeholders and 
central government officials, or a decision by central government officials to shed 
water resource management responsibilities regardless of whether basin 
stakeholders wanted to assume them; 
 The extent of central-government recognition of local-level basin governance; and, 
 Whether central government officials maintained a policy commitment to 
decentralization and basin management through transitions in central government 
administration. 
Characteristics of central government/basin-level relationships and capacities 
Because successful decentralization requires complementary actions at the central 
government and local levels, other aspects of the central-local relationship can be expected 
to condition that success.  Political and institutional variables should be explored that 
relate to the respective capacities of the central government and the basin-level 
stakeholders, and the relationship between them.  Key factors include: 
 The extent to which devolution of water management responsibilities from central 
government to basin institutions has been real or merely rhetorical, and whether 
 34
devolution has been handled as a supportive transition to basin management or as 
an abrupt abandonment of central government authority; 
 The financial resources available to basin-level institutions, and the extent of their 
financial autonomy; 
 Basin management participants’ ability to create and modify institutional 
arrangements that are tailored to their needs and circumstances; 
 The extent of other experience at the local or regional level within the country with 
self-governance and service provision; 
 The distribution (particularly asymmetries) of national-level political influence 
among basin stakeholders; 
 Characteristics of the water rights system in the country which facilitate or hinder 
basin management efforts; and 
 Whether basin-level institutions have had adequate time for implementation and 
adaptation of basin management activities. 
The internal configuration of basin-level institutional arrangements 
Successful implementation of decentralized water resource management will also depend 
on features of the basin-level arrangements created by stakeholders and/or central 
government officials.  Important ones include: 
 
 The presence of basin-level governance institutions; 
 The extent of clarity of institutional boundaries, and their match with basin 
boundaries; 
 Whether and to what extent basin-level institutional arrangements recognize sub-
watershed communities of interest; 
 The availability of forums for information sharing and communication among 
basin stakeholders; 
 The ability to make, monitor, and enforce contingent contracts whereby basin 
stakeholders can agree to contribute to improvements in basin conditions; 
 The institutionalization of regular monitoring of basin conditions by means that are 
trusted by water users; and 
 The availability of forums for conflict resolution. 
 
Certainly, these factors will not all apply with equal significance in all cases.  In each case, 
the emergence and path of river basin management will be affected profoundly by some of 
these variables, affected slightly by others, and not at all by some.  Institutional analysis in 
a case-study setting consists largely in determining which institutional factors in what 
combination appear to have been linked to outcomes.  Furthermore, many of the variables 
listed above have subjective components, and will be assessed differently by different 
participants and observers.  It is therefore essential in these case studies that team 
members interview individuals with a variety of perspectives. 
 
Appendix 2. MATRIX OF LAWS AND ORGANIZATIONS ACCORDING TO DIFFERENT WATER USES 
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to ten times the 
value of the 
damage caused, 





38 and following 
of Law 7593 of 
ARESEP) 
 
Article 29 of Law 















































Define policies and 
administer water 
resources in the entire 
national territory. 
 
Grant Concessions and 
authorize permits for 
water use or discharge in 






wells for water 
extraction, 
conduct works 














Fill out application. 
 
Pay use tax. 
 
Environmental Impact 
Study when required 
by laws or regulations. 
 

















Water Law No. 276, 











See Law Project for 




Management and Use 




















administration of the 
resource.  
 
Authorization, control and 
regulation of activities 
conducted in the area of 
its jurisdiction. 
 
- Control of 
activities that 
cause pollution 














Present application for 
license and patents to 
the Council. 
 
Fines and closing 
of businesses or 
of the respective 
activity. 
 






zones declared as 
protected areas. 
 




















Control of water pollution
 
Quality control of water 





and control of 
dumping solid 







Application for Permit 
from the Ministry of 
Health, Department for 
the Protection of 
Human Environment. 
 
Adapt to the 
dispositions, 
techniques and 













General Health Law, 
1973, Articles 275, 









Law for Wildlife 























solid and liquid 























the Ministry. closure. 
 
 
Dumping Waste and 
Reutilization of 
Wastewater, Decree 
21518 of August 
1991. 
 
Regulation for the 
Management of 
Dangerous Industrial 
Waste, No. 27001 
and Regulation for 
the characteristics 
listed in the 
Dangerous Industrial 


















Approve use of 
techniques for 
sewage disposal 


















measures for the 








plans for river 
 
Elaborate Management 













damage and  
injury. 
 




Law for Soil Use, 
Management and 
Conservation. 1998, 
Articles 6, 19, 21, 
28, 31 
 




MINAE, according to 
Article 7 of the Law 
for Soil Use, 
Management and 
Conservation, and with 
the Ministry of Health, 
according to Articles 




Article 4, SENARA 

























1995,  Article 6. 
 
AQUEDUCTS 




wastewater dumped in 























projects for dumping 




operational reports.  
 
Adapt to the technical 
dispositions of AyA 
and the Ministry of 
Health. 
 
Fines of between 
five and 10 times 
the value of the 
damage caused, 
fines for late 
payment, 
revocation of the 
concession or 
permit according 
to Article 26 de 
Law 2726  for 




- Law for Creation 
of AyA,1961, 
Articles 21, 26 
 
- Regulation for 
dumping waste and 
reusing wastewater, 
26042-S-MINAE, 
Articles 3, 7, 10, 32, 
33. 
 
General Health Law 
1973, and the Law 132 
for Wildlife 







































Concession for utilization 




utilize water for 
irrigation. 
 
Fill out application, 
indicate river, pay use 
tax, indicate 













1995, Articles 50 y 
51. 
 
Law for Soil Use, 
Management and 
Conservation,1998, 
Articles 22 and 63 
 
 
Law for Creation of 
SENARA, No.6877, 
of 18-07-83, Article 4. 
 
Law of ARESEP, 
1996, Article 5 
(paragraph included in 













Law for Soil Use, 
 















to conservation and 
recuperation of soil. 
 
about impact of 
utilization of 























Article 6, clause (g), 
Article 19, clauses 




Articles 15 and 
16,34 













Administers supply of 
water by Irrigation 
Districts in coordination 
with  MAG. 
 
 










recuperation of soil 
activities with  MAG. 
 











Law for creation of  
SENARA, 1983, 
Article 4, clauses (a) 
and (g). 
Water Law of 1942,  
Organic 
Environmental Law, 
1995,  Articles.51, 64-
67 
See: MINAE Project 
for Law for Water 
Resources. 
 
Law for Soil Use, 
Management and 
Conservation,1998,  










the water used 
for irrigation 
 








General Health Law, 
1973,  































Approve tariffs to be 
charged by SENARA for 
its service. 
 
Listen to complaints and 
claims. 
 

















drainage as a 
Public Service 
when it is 
provided by a 
public agency 
or by means of 







study for concessions 
of public services 













or concessions of 
those who 
provide services 
that do not 
comply with 
environmental 
law or  
environmental 
impact studies. 
Law of ARESEP, 









Article 41, clauses 
(j), (k) and (l)   
 
Article 5, clause (e) 























Local government that is 
responsible for regulation 
of interests and services 




Inspector of the 
canton of 
ARESEP. 
Design plan for 
distribution of 
water uses. 


















Water Law, 1942,  
Articles186-198. 
 
Municipal Code, 1982, 
Article 3. 
 





















Concession to utilize 









concession in the 
 
Articles 227 and 226 
Penal Code  
 
See: MINAE Project 














private operators to 
generate hydroelectricity 











Request declaration of 
eligibility from ICE. 
Process authorization 
with the Energy Sector 
of MINAE. 
Process Water with 
Water Department.  
Request concession 




Law of ARESEP, 
1996 
Resources. Private 
generation is currently 
on hold in the 
Constitutional Court, 
claiming the absence 
of a framework law. 
 
Electrical Co 
generation Laws  
#7200 and #5008 


















the Energy Sector 










Laws  #7200  of 1990, 


















study and require a 
declaration for 
eligibility from ICE. 
 
Not having the 
environmental 
impact study will 
obstruct following 










1995,  Articles 17-24. 
























agreed use.  
If there is a Regulatory 
Plan in force, must 
observe the zoning and 
regulations of that. 


























since it has one 
by law. 
 









Issues declaration of 
eligibility when 






Law # 7200 of 1990, 
Organic Law of ICE 
#5961 
Law #7508 of 1996 
 
Law of ARESEP, 




Regulate aspects related to 
















Law of ARESEP, 


































Law of ARESEP, 
1996, Article 41, 






1995,  Articles 17-24. 
 
 
